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I. INTRODUCTION
Philosopher Michel Foucault stated that the State’s power to punish
involves a power to discipline, which “regards individuals both as objects
and as instruments of its exercise . . . . It is not a triumphant power . . . it is
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a modest, suspicious power.”1 Foucault’s words about the State’s power
reveal the tension within the question facing the Texas Criminal Court of
Appeals: does the State have the power to force a death row inmate with
mental illness2 to take medication which may render him competent for his
own execution?3 The issue raises the question of who possesses the power
over the treatment of an individual with mental illness and brings to the
surface an underlying dilemma between mental illness and the legal
system’s competency to address it.4
Courts have struggled to define the scope of the constitutional
protections that safeguard an inmate with mental illness.5 The Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of an inmate who is unable to
comprehend the reasoning for his or her execution in light of his or her
mental illness.6 Still, this allows for an inmate who is diagnosed with a
mental illness to face execution. Moreover, while an inmate who has a
mental illness has a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse
medication, courts have had difficulty defining the scope of this right.7 A
State’s interest in enforcing an inmate’s sentence must be weighed against
the means of enforcing its interest since anti-psychotic medication provides
no panacea for mental illness and may cause irreversible effects.8 This
1. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 170
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (describing the evolution of
punishment from physical torture to discipline and control of a prisoner’s body).
2. Though the term psychosocial disability is preferable, this paper will use the
older terminology of “mental illness” as both the medical community and the relevant
case law use this terminology.
3. See Ex parte Staley, No. WR-37034-05, 2012 WL 1882267 at *1 (Tex. Crim.
App. May 14, 2012) (staying Staley’s execution pending consideration of the
constitutionality of his forced medication for execution).
4. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 5-7 (Richard Howard trans., Vintage Books 1st ed.
1988) (1965) (studying the treatment of patients with mental illness’s in institutions
within a power analysis).
5. See generally Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the
Death Penalty, and Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257, 282 (2007) (noting that
the criminal justice system fails to account for culpability during the crime, adequate
defenses during trial, and the efficacy of post-conviction processes for individuals with
mental illness).
6. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225-27 (1990) (favoring a
state’s interest in safety over a dangerous inmate’s interest in its decisions to forcibly
medicate the inmate); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing a
committed patient’s Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse medication).
8. See generally THE CITIZENS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL,
THE SIDE EFFECTS OF COMMON PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS 20 (2012) [hereinafter CITIZENS
COMMISSION
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS],
available
at
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balancing test is further complicated when the State aims to enforce the
death penalty.9 Courts struggle to establish an adequate balance in such
circumstances and adopt conflicting notions of what constitutes an inmate’s
best medical interest in regards to his or her treatment.10
It is within this unsettled jurisprudence that the Staley case is situated.11
Staley was convicted of capital murder, sentenced to death, and later
diagnosed with schizophrenia.12 When medicated, Staley is considered by
courts to be competent for execution, yet when unmedicated he is
commonly considered to be incompetent for execution. Absent medication,
he at times believed that the judge convicted him and sentenced him to
death as part of a plot to steal his one-of-a-kind red pickup truck.13 Staley
also has a history of being treated with older medication, experiences
undesirable effects from his medication, and often refuses to take this
medication because of these effects.14 The issue is whether the State can
force Staley to take this medication, which may render him competent for
execution.
This Comment argues Staley’s forcible medication violates the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments because it unjustifiably interferes with his
right to bodily integrity and deprives him of his dignity.15 Part II of this

http://www.cchrint.org/pdfs/The_Side_Effects_of_Common_Psychiatric_Drugs.pdf
(mentioning tardive dyskinesia, a potentially irreversible disorder that impairs basic
motor functions and can cause involuntary movement of the lips, tongue, jaw, and
fingers).
9. See Daniel N. Lerman, Second Opinion: Inconsistent Deference to Medical
Ethics in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1941, 1944, 1970 (2007)
(addressing the ethical dilemma physicians face in these situations when they must
consider the consequences of the clinical and legal realities of treatment).
10. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that an inmate has an interest in receiving medication that alleviates his delusions), with
State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (La. 1992) (holding that an inmate never has an
interest in receiving medication that removes the barrier to his execution).
11. Ex parte Staley, No. WR-37034-05, 2012 WL 1882267 at *1
(Tex. Crim. App. May 14, 2012).
12. See Brief for Appellant at app. A, at 31, Staley v. Texas, 233 S.W.3d 337 (Tex.
Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2007) (No. AD-75-462) (noting in a physician’s testimony that
Staley’s diagnosis did not occur until 1993, which was after his trial).
13. See id. at 25 (noting also the instance when Staley believed that Oprah Winfrey
paid off the jury and that his victim was alive).
14. See Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Staley v. Texas, 233 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. Crim.
App. Sept. 12, 2007) (No. AD-75-462) (detailing that, after receiving medication,
Staley suffered paralysis, delusions, and extreme sedation, which led him to lie on the
floor so long he wore a bald spot onto the back of his head).
15. See infra Part II (arguing that administering medication to Staley violates his
recognized right to make decisions about his medical treatment).
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Comment outlines the Eighth Amendment prohibition against executing an
inmate who, due to mental illness, cannot understand the connection
between his or her crime and punishment and the progression of the right to
refuse medication.16 This Comment also describes the growing controversy
around the issue of forcibly medicating an inmate just prior to his
execution.17 Part III applies this constitutional analysis to Staley’s case and
argues that his sentence should be commuted.18 Part IV finds that society
has an interest in preserving the integrity of the medical community and in
avoiding placing inmates in a situation wherein their medication’s
effectiveness makes them eligible for forcible medication and execution.19
Part V concludes that the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals should rule that
Staley’s forcible medication is unconstitutional because it violates his
dignity and bodily integrity.20
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Constitutional Foundation for the Forcible Medication of Death
Row Inmates
1. The Eighth Amendment Protects an Inmate From Experiencing Cruel,
Unusual, and Disproportionate Punishment.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are cruel and unusual
because such punishments are either disproportionate to the crime
committed or barbaric in nature.21 The Supreme Court held that executing
an inmate who lacks a rational understanding of the imminence of his
execution and the reasoning behind it constitutes cruel and unusual

16. See id. (discussing the protections within the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments and relevant case law defining when an inmate is competent for
execution and can refuse medication).
17. See infra Part III (introducing the differing analyses the Singleton and Perry
courts employed to determine whether forced medication for execution was in an
inmate’s interest).
18. See id. (determining that, given the underlying rationales provided by the
Supreme Court in forcible medication and competency for execution cases, Staley’s
forcible medication violates constitutional protections).
19. See infra Part IV (arguing that rationales embedded in preserving medicine as a
“healing art” and in protecting inmates’ dignity support Staley’s right to refuse
medication).
20. See infra Part V (concluding that Staley’s forcible medication is
unconstitutional and that commuting his sentence represents a viable alternative).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)
(articulating the view that the Eighth Amendment, grounded in the dignity of man,
tempers the power of the court to punish “within the limits of civilized standards”).
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punishment, and, thus, runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s protections.22
Finding support in common law, the Court in Ford v. Wainwright held
that executing an inmate who was unable to understand the reason for his
execution due to his mental illness was cruel and unusual in part because
no retributive purpose was served by his execution.23 The Court, in a
plurality opinion, stated that it would offend societal decency to exact this
“mindless vengeance” on an inmate as a punishment.24
Because the majority opinion failed to define when an inmate could not
be executed in this context, Justice Powell, in his concurrence, provided a
standard to determine when an inmate was incompetent to be executed.25
Here, an inmate is incompetent to be executed if the inmate is unable to
understand: (1) the imminence of his or her execution and (2) the reason
why he or she is being executed.26 Justice Powell also noted that an inmate
could be executed only if the inmate was cured of his or her illness.27
Although treatment and medication can control the symptoms of mental
illness, mental illnesses are understood to have no cure.28
Justice Powell’s standard for competency was widely accepted by state
legislatures and used in Panetti v. Quarterman to determine whether
Panetti, the inmate, was competent for execution.29 In Panetti, the Court
22. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 403, 409-10 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(holding that executing Ford was unconstitutional because his punishment inflicted
suffering without understanding since he believed he owned the prisons, could control
the Governor through mind waves, and would not be executed); see also Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957-60 (2007) (clarifying that an inmate’s understanding of
execution must be rational and not rooted in the manifestations of his illness).
23. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 403-04 (holding that Ford’s execution served no
retributive purpose since Ford did not connect his execution to his crime and believed
he was free to leave the prison whenever he wanted).
24. See id. at 409-10 (noting that executing an individual who was unable to
understand his impending execution offended humanity); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at
101 (finding that the Eighth Amendment’s protections evolve with “standards of
decency”).
25. Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring).
26. See id. at 419-22 (using principles of dignity embedded in the Eighth
Amendment to compose this definition of competency).
27. See id. at 425 n.5 (mentioning that certain inmates may permanently lose their
mental faculties and thus may avoid execution altogether). But see MD. CODE ANN.,
CORR. SERVS. § 3-904(b) (2004) (stating that an inmate is not incompetent if his
competence is sustained by treatment).
28. See generally What Does Recovery Look Like, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL
ILLNESS, http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By_Illness (last visited January
29, 2013) (noting that effective treatments, but not cures, exist for mental illnesses).
29. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954-55, 957-60 (2007) (clarifying
that Ford’s safeguards also protected Panetti, who was convicted of murder, believed
his victim was alive, and thought he was being executed to stop preaching); see also
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held that Panetti’s mere awareness of the link between a crime and
punishment was insufficient because it allowed the symptoms of Panetti’s
illness, namely his delusions, to provide the basis for his competency.30
Panetti’s punishment was stripped of its retributive purpose when he
believed his execution was due to spiritual warfare and not due to his
crime.31 As a result, the Court promulgated its test requiring that an inmate
have a rational understanding of the imminence of his execution and the
reasoning behind it.32
2. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects an Inmate’s Right to Bodily
Integrity, Which Includes the Inmate’s Right to Make Decisions About His
or Her Medical Treatment.
The Fourteenth Amendment safeguards an individual’s bodily integrity
when the state attempts to violate the individual’s dignity and due process
rights by unjustifiably infringing on his or her life or liberty.33 This
protection extends to the right of an individual with mental illness to refuse
treatment with anti-psychotic medication.34 Where inmates are concerned,
the Supreme Court permits forcible medication only when: (1) an inmate is
a danger to himself or others, (2) medication is medically appropriate, and
(3) no less intrusive alternative is viable to serve an important state
interest.35
Lyn Entzeroth, The Illusion of Sanity: The Constitutional and Moral Danger of
Medicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REV. 641,
646 (2009) (noting that many state competency statutes correspond to Ford’s standard).
30. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 960 (noting that Panetti’s belief that his execution was
a sham was a belief caused by his illness, not by a denial of his crime).
31. Id. at 959-61.
32. But see Debra Cassens Weiss, New Stay Granted for Inmate Claiming
‘Grandiose Delusion’ Bars His Execution, ABA JOURNAL NEWS (Oct 24, 2012)
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_stay_of_execution_granted_for_inmate_s
eeking_hearing_on_mental_health_i/ (discussing whether Panetti and Ford have been
correctly applied in the ongoing case of John Ferguson, a Florida death row inmate
who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, believes he is the Prince of God, and yet is
poised to be executed).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir.
1983) (finding that anti-psychotic medication is dangerous and forcible medication
violates bodily integrity); Michael Ashley Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1203, 1217 n.78 (2007) (citing Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach
that finds that a state must ensure that an individual can “live a ‘truly human’
existence” by ensuring that he or she can exercise ten central capabilities including
bodily integrity).
34. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that a patient
can appreciate the risks and benefits of treatment, can refuse treatment, and is entitled
to safeguards before being forcibly medicated).
35. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (requiring that the forced
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This protection developed from the right of a patient with a mental
illness in a hospital to be involved in his or her treatment decisions and
refuse medication even when found incompetent.36 This safeguard was
applied to prisoners in Washington v. Harper, when the Supreme Court
held that Harper, an inmate with mental illness, could be forcibly
medicated only when: (1) he was a danger to himself and others and (2) his
treatment was medically appropriate.37 The Court emphasized that the
State had a legitimate interest in forcibly medicating Harper since he was
found to be dangerous absent medication. Moreover, it also found that
Harper’s forced medication was medically appropriate since a doctor
ethically prescribed the medication solely for his treatment.38
In Riggins v. Nevada, the Court applied the Harper standard to a trial
competency context and emphasized evaluating a medication’s side effects
within the medically appropriate prong of this standard.39 Riggins was
forcibly medicated to stand trial and was later convicted of robbery and
murder.40 The Court remanded the case, noting that medication could
make a defendant appear overtly sedated and calm during the proceedings,
which could influence a determination of guilt.41 Justice Kennedy, in his
medication analysis consider less intrusive alternatives that are likely to achieve a
similar result); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1992) (finding medically
appropriate treatment considers a medication’s side effects); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 225-27 (1990) (asserting that an inmate may be forcibly medicated when
he is a danger to himself or others and it is medically appropriate).
36. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 301 (1982) (recognizing that when
found incompetent, a patient with a mental illness has the right to be involved in his
treatment decisions through the substituted judgment standard). The substituted
judgment standard relies on the patient’s past preferences regarding medication to
inform his treatment when found to be incompetent. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269 (holding
that medication may only be forcibly administered to a committed patient when, in a
physician’s professional judgment, the patient is dangerous).
37. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (finding the State’s interest was paramount
because of Harper’s assault of a nurse).
38. See id. at 226-27 (noting that physicians can only prescribe medication for a
patient’s treatment and that the American Psychological Association found that
medication was effective in treating symptoms). But see id. at 239 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (mentioning Harper’s statement that he would have rather died than taken
his medication since it resulted in paralysis).
39. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137-38 (finding that a medication’s effects may
influence a defendant’s ability to assist counsel and receive a fair trial).
40. See id. at 142-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that Riggins was strongly
medicated with Mellaril, a drug that can severely depress basic motor and cognitive
functions).
41. See id. at 134, 137-38 (majority opinion) (stating that Riggins’s medication
could make him drowsy and confused, which could have an impact on his outward
appearance, testimony, and examination).
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concurrence, found that until effective drugs have minimal side effects, a
defendant should only be forcibly medicated when it does not render his
trial unfair.42 This concern, coupled with the potential of a medication’s
serious effects, emphasizes the importance of requiring the state to
demonstrate an important government interest before it can forcibly
medicate an inmate.43
Finally, in Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that only
on rare occasions could an inmate with mental illness be forcibly medicated
to stand trial.44 The Court remanded the case, noting that Sell’s forcible
medication was not medically appropriate since it failed to consider the
potential side effects of his medication and his alternative treatment
options.45 The Court noted that the possibility of receiving alternative
treatment in a mental health institution weighed against the state’s interest
in prosecution.46 In return, the dissent argued that this possibility would
cause defendants to engage in opportunistic behavior to manipulate their
trials and avoid prosecution.47 Nonetheless, the test that was solidified in
Sell found that Sell could be forcibly medicated only if he was dangerous,
his medication was medically appropriate, and no less intrusive options
were plausible to actually further the State’s important interest.48
B. The Controversy
Because the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of
forcibly medicating inmates to render them competent for execution, lower
42. Id. at 142-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. See id. at 135-36, 138 (majority opinion) (finding that although adjudication of
a murder charge was an important interest, forced medication still needed to be the
least intrusive means for this end); see also id. at 156 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding
that this approach applied a strict scrutiny analysis).
44. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003).
45. See id. at 179 (citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Riggins acknowledging
medication’s dangerous side effects but also noting that if Sell’s medication was
authorized due to his dangerousness, the need to justify authorization on other grounds
would be less important); see also United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 748 (9th
Cir. 2012) (relying on this justification in Sell for forcibly medicating a prisoner
because he is dangerous to justify forcibly medicating Jared Loughner).
46. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81 (finding that the State’s interest in bringing the
accused to trial is essential for justice, but a consideration of an inmate’s interest given
his medical interest is necessary).
47. See id. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that criminals could disrupt
proceedings by conveniently not taking medication for their benefit).
48. See generally Jeremy P. Burnette, The Supreme Court “Sells” Charles
Singleton Short: Why the Court Should Have Granted Certiorari to Singleton v. Norris
After Reversing United States v. Sell, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 551 (2004) (defining
the standard for forcible medication after Sell).
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courts have reached divergent conclusions on this constitutional issue.49
One interpretation emerged from State v. Perry, where the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to forcibly medicate Perry,
a death row inmate, solely for the purpose of executing him.50 The court
found that forcibly medicating Perry violated Louisiana’s constitution since
it rendered treatment a punishment with added indignity.51 The court noted
that Perry’s physician had conflicting responsibilities to the state and to
Perry, which left room for the physician to make arbitrary decisions about
Perry’s treatment options.52 The physician had to determine whether the
treatment provided to Perry for his illness could be separated from the
reality that this treatment would hasten his execution. If the physician
decided this was possible, he or she may violate the Hippocratic Oath when
treatment meant to alleviate suffering contributes to a punishment that
results in death.53 The court also reasoned that indignity was added to
punishment since Perry would be cognizant of the violation of his bodily
integrity for his execution.54 The court determined that when achieved
through his forced medication, Perry’s competency addressed the
symptoms of his illness rather than curing his illness and thus did not pass
Ford’s constitutional threshold for competency.55
Furthermore, the court held that Perry’s forced medication was not
medically appropriate since it did not allow him to discuss his treatment

49. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that an inmate’s forcible medication is not unconstitutional when his execution date is
pending), with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (La. 1992) (holding that forcibly
medicating an inmate and carrying out his execution thereafter was unconstitutional),
and Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 56, 61 (S.C. 1993) (applying the American Bar
Association’s standard for competency to find forcible medication unconstitutional).
50. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 771.
51. Id. at 750.
52. See id. at 752-53 (finding that, in this situation, a physician cannot use
“informed and dispassionate professional judgment”).
53. See id. at 752-55 (adding that this scheme also undermined the basic trust of the
physician-patient relationship); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242, 274
(1972) (holding that one of the markers of cruel and unusual punishment is the arbitrary
infliction of punishment); AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, E-2.06
Capital Punishment (2000) [hereinafter AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS], available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion206.page? (finding that the
Hippocratic Oath prevents doctors from rendering an inmate competent for execution
who was found incompetent).
54. See Perry, 610 at 763 (stating this scheme turned Perry’s life into a means for
the state’s ends).
55. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 759.
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with a physician acting in his best medical interest.56 The court found that
the state could not separate its interest in medicating and treating Perry
from its underlying goal of executing him.57 Perry’s own death could never
be in his best medical interest and therefore, Perry’s forced medication was
unconstitutional.58
Yet, in Singleton v. Norris, the Eighth Circuit held that Singleton, an
inmate convicted of murder, could be forcibly medicated when his
execution date was pending.59 The court reasoned that medicating
Singleton was constitutional since the medication alleviated his delusions,
caused no serious effects, and allowed Singleton to understand the
connection between his crime and punishment.60
The court distinguished its holding from Perry on two grounds: (1) Perry
applied Louisiana law and (2) Perry found, within the medically
appropriate analysis, that the defendant’s treatment could not be separated
from his punishment.61 The Singleton court maintained that Singleton’s
own interest in taking medication to abate his symptoms, coupled with the
state’s significant interest in enforcing his sentence, rendered his forced
medication constitutional.62
C. State v. Staley
In 1991, Steven Staley was convicted of robbery and murder, sentenced
to death, and later diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. Since then,
Staley has been partially compliant with taking his medication.63 Staley
experiences adverse effects from his medication and the medication alone
has proven ineffective in treating his illness.64 In 2006, he was forcibly
56. Id. at 768.
57. See id. at 761 (emphasizing that discussions of Perry’s treatment were only
centered on his competency and thus on removing the barrier preventing his execution).
58. But see id. at 780 (Cole, J., dissenting) (finding that a state’s interest in
protecting society from murderers seeking to avoid punishment by feigning illness
could render forced medication in this instance constitutional).
59. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003).
60. But see id. at 1031 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (mentioning that, while medicated,
Singleton believed he was under a voodoo curse that turned his food into worms).
61. Id. at 1026 (majority opinion).
62. See id. at 1024-25 (relying on the Eighth Circuit’s emphasis in Sell that Sell’s
forced medication was justified to bring him to trial). But see Burnette, supra note 48,
at 541-43 (arguing that because at the time Singleton was decided the Supreme Court
had granted certiorari to and later reversed Sell, Singleton was wrongly decided).
63. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 15 (noting Staley’s protests about
taking his medication due to its effects).
64. See id. at 14 (noting that after being medicated with Haldol, Staley has
experienced paralysis and continued delusions).
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medicated for his execution.65 Yet, his execution was repeatedly stayed
and continues to be appealed due to the debate over the constitutionality of
his forced medication.66
Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Staley cannot be executed
if he does not understand (1) the imminence of his execution and (2) the
reasoning for his execution.67 Yet, the Staley case emerges from a
jurisdiction where courts have been slow to enforce Panetti’s safeguards
and where several inmates with mental disabilities have recently been
executed.68 From this context, it is uncertain whether a Texas court will
find that forcibly medicating Staley on the eve of his execution is
constitutional.69
III. ANALYSIS
A. Forcibly Medicating Staley Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Under the Eighth Amendment Because It Does Not Pass The Ford/Panetti
Test.
Forcibly medicating Staley violates the Eighth Amendment because his
forcible medication: (1) would result in a medication-induced competency
that does not conform with the Supreme Court’s competency requirement,
(2) would not further a retributive purpose, and (3) would conflict with
evolving standards of decency by turning his treatment into additional and

65. Staley v. State, 233 S.W.3d 337, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
66. Ex parte Staley, 2012 WL 1882267, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 14, 2012).
67. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05 (West 2007).
68. See Vidisha Barua, Synthetic Sanity: A Way Around the Eighth Amendment?,
44 CRIM. L. BULL. 4, 8 (2008) (noting that from 2003 to 2005, Texas executed three
inmates with mental illness); see also Martiya Karimjee, Marvin Wilson Execution
Goes Ahead in Texas Despite Claims of Low IQ, GLOBAL POST (August 8, 2012)
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/unitedstates/120808/marvin-wilson-execution-goes-ahead-texas-despite (last visited February
1, 2013) (addressing Texas’s recent execution of an individual with an intellectual
disability).
69. See Green v. State, 374 S.W.3d 434, 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that
the fact that a defendant claimed that he was innocent of his crime indicated that he
understood the reasoning for his execution and even though the record presented
evidence of his incompetency, this understanding was sufficient to find him competent
under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). In light of this case the parties to the
Staley case were required to submit briefs partially on the question of whether the
forcible medication issue was under review under the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. Staley’s brief asserts what his claims are and also presents an argument that
Staley’s forcible medication renders him in state wherein he is incompetent to be
executed under the Atkins v. Virginia standard. Brief for Appellant, at 15, Ex parte
Staley, 2012 WL 6729419 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (No. AP-76798).
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arbitrary punishment.70 Reaching this conclusion requires the application
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to the Staley case to determine
whether Staley’s understanding passes the Supreme Court’s threshold for
competency. The controversy in this case revolves around whether Staley
merely must achieve a rational understanding of his execution, or whether
the means of achieving this understanding must pass the Supreme Court’s
standard for competency.71
1. Justice Powell’s Standard is the Appropriate Test to Use Under the
Eighth Amendment Because the Supreme Court in Panetti Used This
Standard for Its Competency Determination and State Legislatures Have
Used the Standard to Formulate Their Competency Statutes.
Though Ford’s competency standard is found in Justice Powell’s
concurrence, it is the appropriate standard for the Eighth Amendment
analysis of this forcible medication issue. Justice Powell’s standard not
only corresponds to the majority’s holding that executing an inmate who
does not understand why he is to die is unconstitutional, but was also
incorporated into numerous state competency statutes.72 Additionally, in
2007, the Supreme Court in Panetti clarified Justice Powell’s definition of
competency, which underscores that Justice Powell’s test remains the
relevant standard for this Eighth Amendment analysis.73
2. Staley’s Competency Achieved by His Forced Medication Does Not Pass
the Ford/Panetti Competency Test Because It Does Not Ensure That He
Will Have a Rational Understanding of the Nature and Purpose of His
Execution Nor Does It Comport with the Underlying Rationales Provided
for This Test.
Forcing Staley to take medication that may render him competent for
execution violates the Eighth Amendment. The treatment of Staley’s
illness reveals his history of adverse effects from medication and has not

70. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 15.
71. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (focusing on
whether Singleton would achieve Ford competency under the Eighth Amendment as it
was decided before Panetti), with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747-48 (La. 1992)
(focusing on whether the means by which Perry achieved competency violated the
Eighth Amendment).
72. See generally Entzeroth, supra note 29, at 646 (mentioning among others
Oregon’s competency statute, which states that a death warrant may not be issued until
a defendant understands the reason for his execution).
73. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 932 (2007) (using Justice Powell’s
concurrence in Ford to find that a rational understanding was part of the definition of
awareness).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

13

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 5

906

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:4

ensured his competency.74 Furthermore, the effects of medication, which
were acknowledged in Riggins to influence Riggins’s ability to assist his
counsel and participate in his trial, can also influence Staley’s
understanding of and participation in his execution.75 Staley’s experience
of extreme lethargy, apathy, and catatonia after being forcibly medicated
make it unlikely that the competency he receives thereafter satisfies the
safeguards established by Ford and Panetti.76
Indeed, the Singleton court’s reliance on medication as the ultimate
remedy for incompetency for execution is contrasted by the Perry court’s
determination that medication-induced competency is artificial and does
not pass the Ford competency test.77 The flaw in the Singleton reasoning is
in its failure to consider the underpinnings of Ford’s competency test,
namely an execution’s retributive value and the opportunity for an inmate
to prepare for his death.78 That Ford believed he could not be executed
because he could control the Governor through mind waves reinforced the
view that he did not connect his execution to his crime and would not be
able to meaningfully prepare for his death.79 Similarly, evidence shows
that Staley when unmedicated believed he was convicted because the judge
wanted to steal his pickup truck and, when medicated, experienced adverse
effects and may require different doses of medication so he can achieve
competency.80 These facts reinforce the view that even if Staley can
74. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 12-13 (noting that Staley experienced
hallucinations while medicated).
75. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-38 (1992) (noting that Riggins’s
medication could have made him suffer from confusion and affected his testimony);
Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 14 (mentioning the powerful nature of Staley’s
medication, which left him in a catatonic stupor). See generally Mahendra T. Bhati et
al., Clinical Manifestations, Diagnosis, and Empirical Treatments for Catatonia, 4
PSYCHIATRY
46
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2922358 (noting that catatonic stupors
depress an individual’s motor functions leaving him motionless and commonly mute,
and that catatonia is a symptom of certain types of schizophrenia, which can also be
exacerbated by certain medications, including Haldol).
76. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22.
77. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 759 (La. 1992) (finding that antipsychotic
medications induce artificial competency because they do not cure but rather calm and
mask the symptoms of mental illness).
78. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
(stating that no retributive purpose is served if an inmate is aware of his execution’s
imminence but not why it is to occur).
79. See id. at 410 (majority opinion).
80. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at app. A, at 18 (mentioning, in
physician’s testimony, concern that Staley’s condition was deteriorating and that
walking into his execution he may no longer be aware of the connection between his
crime and punishment).
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connect his crime and punishment he will be denied the opportunity to
meaningfully prepare for his execution.
Hence, Singleton’s finding that competency achieved by forced
medication is constitutional does not comport with Panetti’s interpretation
of Ford. In Panetti, decided after Perry and Singleton, the Court
recognized that a test for competency that ignored Panetti’s ability to
rationally appreciate and understand the connection between his crime and
punishment before he confronts his execution was unconstitutional.81
Likewise, a test for competency that ignores that to rationally appreciate
and understand the connection between his crime and punishment, Staley
must be forced to take medication that can affect the clarity of his cognitive
ability prior to his execution is similarly unconstitutional. While the
Panetti Court’s failure to delineate what constitutes a rational
understanding reveals a key flaw in its mental health capital punishment
law, its clarification of Ford should be interpreted to also protect an inmate
who cannot be assured to achieve a rational understanding absent
medication and who is forced to take medication that could impact how he
confronts his execution.82 In light of these safeguards, Staley’s competency
achieved after he is forcibly medicated does not comport with the
underlying rationales of Ford and Panetti.
3. Forcibly Medicating Staley to Render Him Competent For His Execution
Does Not Serve a Retributive Purpose Because His Competency is Not
Guaranteed and May Only Be Artificial.
Forcibly medicating Staley to establish his competency for execution is
unconstitutional because it would not fulfill a basic purpose of enforcing
the death penalty: retribution. The Singleton and Perry courts present two
divergent rationales on this issue. Whereas the Singleton court found that
the retributive goals of the death penalty are served when an inmate
understands the link between his crime and punishment, the Perry court
found that competency achieved by forced medication did not fulfill this
goal.83
Yet, consider the Supreme Court’s rationale in Panetti. The Court found
81. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957-60 (2007).
82. See Bonnie, supra note 5, at 283 (suggesting that Panetti’s inability to fully
define rational understanding exposes the Court’s failure to clarify its mental health
capital sentencing jurisprudence).
83. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the state’s interest in enforcing Singleton’s sentence was served when he was
aware of the nature and purpose of his punishment), with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d
746, 747-48 (La. 1992) (holding that the state’s enforcement of Perry’s sentence was
unconstitutional when Perry’s awareness of the nature and purpose of his punishment
was the effect of his forced medication).
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that Panetti’s illness caused him to believe that his victim was still alive
and that his execution was part of spiritual warfare, which differed greatly
from the rationale of the state’s punishment for his crime.84 Similarly,
executing Staley, who, because of his illness, believes his execution is due
to the judge’s desire for his pickup truck, and will likely be medicated to
understand the rationale for his punishment, is unconstitutional.85 This is
because given Staley’s history of experiencing adverse effects after being
medicated, it is uncertain whether Staley’s understanding of his execution
when he is medicated meaningfully corresponds to the rationale of those
seeking his punishment.86 Executing Panetti, who lacked a rational
understanding of his execution due to his illness was unconstitutional and
lacked a retributive effect. Similarly, Staley likely has to be medicated to
attain such a rational understanding, may experience catatonia after
receiving medication, and could be subject to changes in medication to
maintain this understanding. This reality does not comport with Ford’s
rationale that an inmate have an opportunity to appreciate the imminence
and purpose of his punishment prior to execution for his execution to serve
a retributive purpose.87 Thus, forcibly medicating Staley on the eve of his
execution does not advance the state’s retributive goal.
4. Forcibly Medicating Staley Violates the Prohibition Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishment as Recognized in Ford Since It Deprives Him of His
Dignity by Turning His Treatment into Additional and Arbitrary
Punishment.
Forcibly medicating Staley to render him competent for execution
inflicts an additional and arbitrary punishment. The Eighth Amendment’s
protection of human dignity safeguards an inmate’s ability to prepare for
his or her death and protects the inmate from society’s attempts to exact
additional punishment from him or her.88 The Singleton and Perry courts
again approached this issue by employing two different rationales.
Whereas the Singleton court found that Singleton did not experience
additional punishment since being medicated was in his medical interest,
the Perry court found that such a scheme stripped Perry of his dignity and
84. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959-60.
85. Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at app. A, at 8-9.
86. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 14-15 (arguing that leading a heavilymedicated and stoned Staley to death serves no retributive purpose).
87. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
88. See id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that it is unconstitutional to
execute an individual who does not have an opportunity to prepare “mentally and
spiritually” for his death); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (finding
that the state’s power to punish an inmate is limited by the Eighth Amendment’s
protection of civilized standards of decency).
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inflicted arbitrary punishment.89 The difference between these two views
centers upon whether the court finds that treatment can be separated from
punishment or whether both of these state motives are entwined.
Indeed, in Perry, the court found that instead of suffering the mere
extinguishment of his life, Perry’s forcible medication turned his life into a
means for the state’s ends by forcing treatment upon him that would
become the means to, and the mere preparation for, his death.90 The court
noted that seeking to disguise as medical treatment what was solely an
attempt to render Perry competent for execution was an additional and
arbitrary punishment.91 Nonetheless, the Singleton court found that a
treatment, which abates delusion, was in Singleton’s interest and, thus, was
not a punishment.92 Thus, unlike the Perry court, the Singleton court
approached this issue by recognizing Singleton’s short-term medical
interest in treatment as separate from his punishment.
While Staley’s execution is a lawfully imposed punishment and Staley
has an interest in any respite medication may provide, the Eighth
Amendment protects Staley’s dignity. Staley’s medication is, at times,
effective in treating the symptoms of his illness, and yet his treatment has
centered on medicating him with older anti-psychotic drugs to render him
competent for execution.93
Thus, framing Staley’s treatment with
medication as beneficial, when it involves older medication, is addressed
primarily in terms of whether it will render him competent and not on its
potential effects, and ultimately is administered against his will, exacts the
additional and arbitrary punishment Ford warned is prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment.94 Here, a treatment framed and discussed in terms of
competency is a treatment for Staley that is not separated from his
punishment.
Moreover, the Perry court held that turning treatment into punishment

89. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that
that if an inmate concedes that medication is effective in abating the symptoms of his
illness then its forcible administration prior to his execution is not unconstitutional),
with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 766 (La. 1992) (reinforcing the view that forcibly
medicating Perry stripped him of control over his mind prior to his execution).
90. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 768.
91. Id. at 766.
92. Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026.
93. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at 3 (noting Staley’s medication with the
anti-psychotic drug Haldol, which is an older anti-psychotic drug); see also, CITIZENS
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 23 (mentioning the FDA alert that
patients treated intravenously or in high doses with Haldol experienced heart
abnormalities and death).
94. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (finding that the Eighth
Amendment protects against society exacting vengeance on an inmate).
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violated the integrity of the medical community, which led to arbitrary
The forcible
punishment, an issue not considered in Singleton.95
medication of an inmate for execution requires a physician’s conflicting
loyalty to his or her patients when the physician must choose between
assuaging a patient’s symptoms through medication that could result in the
patient’s execution or allowing the patient to suffer from the symptoms of
the patient’s illness.96 The Perry court warned that punishments could be
arbitrarily enforced when physicians weigh these interests.97 Indeed, this
punishment was arbitrary in Singleton because it rested in part upon a
determination that Singleton’s good fortune of not experiencing many
effects to his medication implied that medication was in his best medical
interest.98 Nonetheless, while Staley has benefited from medication, he
also has experienced its side effects, which allows his physicians to make
arbitrary decisions about his treatment. Such “treatment” results in
arbitrary punishment and reveals the flaw in the Singleton court’s rationale.
Furthermore, under Harper, medication cannot be prescribed for any
reason other than medical treatment.99 Yet, in Staley’s case, the state has
largely focused on addressing Staley’s treatment in terms of medicating
him for competency proceedings, revealing that it has not separated
treatment from punishment.100 Moreover, the medical community has
indicated that it finds forcibly medicating an inmate when it will render
him competent for execution to constitute a punishment.101 The American
Medical Association (AMA) and the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) both condemned a physician’s involvement in this practice.102
Thus, if one defers to the standards of the medical community, forcibly
medicating prisoners constitutes a punishment, which violates the Eighth

95. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752 (stating that while the Hippocratic Oath requires
that a physician alleviate suffering and do no harm, the State’s forcible medication
order involves an active participation in execution).
96. Lerman, supra note 9, at 1944.
97. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752-53.
98. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003). But see id. at 1031
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (mentioning that even when medicated Singleton experienced
delusions).
99. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S 210, 222 n.8 (1990) (noting that Harper’s
medication was in his interest because it was ethically prescribed by a doctor).
100. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22.
101. See Lerman, supra note 9, at 1969, 1973 (discussing the state’s interest in the
integrity of the medical profession, which needs to allow physicians to balance the
consequences of all treatment options, including non-treatment).
102. See id. at 1945, 1950, 1974 (noting that although membership to the APA or
AMA is not required to practice medicine, both organizations modified their policies to
find forcibly medicating death row inmates unethical).
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Amendment.
Indeed, if such a scheme can be found constitutional and the state has the
power to deny Staley the ability to control his bodily integrity and
treatment by forcibly medicating him, one is left to wonder where the line
protecting individuals under the Eighth Amendment remains.103 A death
row inmate has acquired the opportunity to choose his last meal, his
method of execution in some states, and ultimately his final words, yet the
forcible medication scheme deprives Staley of this conception of choice
about how he confronts his treatment and own death by forcing him to take
medication against his will.104 Such a punishment is categorically different
from and disproportionate to another’s punishment and resembles the kind
of “mindless vengeance” Justice Marshall warned violates the Eighth
Amendment.105 Framing Staley’s treatment in terms of competency,
allowing for arbitrary decisions to be made about this treatment, and
denying Staley a choice about whether he receives the treatment turns his
treatment into an unconstitutional punishment.106
B. Forcibly Medicating Staley to Render Him Competent for His Own
Execution Violates His Fundamental Due Process Rights Ensured under
the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Is Not in His Best Medical Interest
and Unjustifiably Violates His Bodily Integrity.
The Supreme Court held that an inmate may be forcibly medicated only
when (1) he is a danger to himself or others, (2) medication is medically
appropriate, meaning it is medically ethical and in the inmate’s best
interest, and (3) no viable less intrusive alternatives exist that will actually
further an important state interest.107 The difference between the Perry and
Singleton decisions focused upon the courts’ interpretations of the second
prong of this test, namely whether it could be seen as medically appropriate

103. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (emphasizing the Eighth
Amendment’s protection of human dignity).
104. See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82
IOWA L. REV. 319, 378 (1997) (stating that some states allow a prisoner to choose
between lethal injections and other methods of execution); see also Bonnie, supra note
5, at 277 (arguing that the ability to prepare and choose how one confronts death is
inherent in the Eighth Amendment protections and delineated in Ford and Trop).
105. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
106. See id. (holding that executing an inmate whose illness prevented him from
understanding why he was to die was unconstitutional because it offered no capacity
for the inmate to come to terms with his conscience, and offended human decency and
dignity).
107. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178-79 (2003) (applying this
constitutional standard in an analysis of whether to forcibly medicate a defendant for
trial).
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and in an inmate’s best interest to be forcibly medicated in light of his
This discussion invokes questions
approaching execution date.108
regarding whether treatment can be separated from punishment and
whether it can ever be in an inmate’s interest to receive medication that
may lead to his or her death. The third prong of the test, which weighs the
State’s interest against less intrusive alternatives, was also a point of
controversy between the Perry and Singleton courts.109 In light of the
Supreme Court’s analysis, Staley’s forcible medication prior to his
execution is unconstitutional because: (1) it is not in his best medical
interest to be forced to receive treatment that may result in his death and (2)
it deprives him of bodily integrity absent a legitimate state interest.110
1. Forcibly Medicating Staley Is Unconstitutional Because It Is Not in His
Best Medical Interest to Be Forced to Receive Medication That May Result
in His Death.
The Court in Harper held that the state had an interest in preserving
safety in the prison environment; however, the Court also found that forced
medication is only constitutional when it is ethically prescribed by a doctor
for treatment.111 Since that ruling, when confronted with the medically
appropriate analysis, the Riggins and Sell Courts emphasized the dangers
associated with anti-psychotic medication and an individual’s liberty
interest in refusing medication.112 The Court sees both of these concerns as
important in evaluating whether forced medication is in an individual’s best
medical interest.
Thus, when analyzing whether forcible medication was in a death row
inmate’s best medical interest, the Perry court viewed treatment as
medically appropriate if it comported with medical ethics and sustained

108. Compare Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that
forcible medication is in the inmate’s best medical interest if it alleviates his delusions),
with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 761 (La. 1992) (noting that forcibly medicating
Perry prior to his execution could never be in his best medical interest).
109. Compare Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1026 (highlighting the state’s important
interest in administering Singleton’s sentence and that Singleton likely could not be
rendered competent through other means), with Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761 (noting the
second prong of the analysis could never be fulfilled because of the state’s ultimate
interest in executing Perry).
110. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S 210, 225-26, 250 (1990) (finding that
forced medication still must be in the inmate’s best medical interest despite a state’s
interest in preserving prison safety); see also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300-01
(1982), remanded 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that a patient with mental
illness has a constitutional right to be involved in his or her treatment decisions).
111. Harper, 494 U.S at 226.
112. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179; Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992).
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Perry’s life.113 However, there are situations when taking medication that
may hasten death may be in an individual’s best medical interest, including
receiving chemotherapy as a terminally ill cancer patient.114 While it is
difficult to surmise that it is in Staley’s best medical interest to receive
treatment prescribed by a physician who is acting arbitrarily when he or she
administers medication, it is in Staley’s interest to experience the relief
medication may provide him. Here, if Staley’s treatment is separated from
his punishment, it could be argued that it is in Staley’s best medical interest
to receive medication even though it may hasten his death. Indeed, the
Singleton court argued that it was in Singleton’s interest to take medication
that would alleviate his delusions and, which he agreed absent his
impending execution date, was in his interest to take.115 Additionally,
because the Perry court did not establish how much weight should be given
to a state’s interest if an inmate is found to be dangerous, it is uncertain
whether Staley’s medication could be justified on other grounds.116 Thus,
the Perry and Singleton courts again took divergent approaches towards
this issue.
Nevertheless, though medication is certainly an integral part of Staley’s
treatment, it is difficult to argue that his treatment is medically appropriate
if the physicians prescribing the treatment are prohibited by both the APA
and the AMA from administering it.117 Indeed, even if Staley is found to
be dangerous or if it is in his interest to receive medication, which could
hasten his death, under the Harper standard it is not medically appropriate
to receive unethical medical treatment.118
However, ultimately this issue comes down to the question of choice,
which was recognized as the right of an individual with a mental illness to
refuse dangerous and invasive medication and to be involved in his or her
treatment decisions.119 While there are situations in which an individual
may choose to receive medication that might hasten his or her death, the

113. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 752, 761.
114. Lerman, supra note 9, at 1944, 1947.
115. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (majority opinion).
116. See id. at 1036 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (noting that by tying Perry’s medication
to the State’s goal of retribution, the court presumed the state only had one motive).
117. See generally Lerman, supra note 9, at 1945, 1969 (noting that both the AMA
and APA disallow physicians to administer medication to inmates whose execution
rests on his or her forcible medication).
118. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S 210, 214 (1990).
119. See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that a patient with
mental illness can appreciate the benefits and risks of medication and should be
involved in his or her treatment plan); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 268 (3d Cir.
1983) (recognizing a committed patient’s right to refuse medication).
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crucial element here is that of choice.120
Staley cannot choose to avoid his punishment; however, depriving him
of his right to make decisions about his medical treatment after his
conviction subjects him to an imposition of the state’s power absent the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protections.121 Here, given that the importance of
considering the actual impact of medication on the individual and the
individual’s own medical interest were affirmed in Riggins and Sell, the
fact that an inmate, as in Singleton, consents or does not strongly protest
medication at one time should not mean that he does not have a right to
refuse it at another.122 The conception of treatment, not punishment,
involves the ability to make decisions that at times medication is
appropriate and at others it is not. This recognition ultimately protects
Staley’s bodily integrity. Indeed, given Staley’s medical history of
experiencing side effects to medication, the potential ineffectiveness of his
medication in treating his illness, and his treatment with older medication,
his choice regarding his treatment seems to be of greater importance.123
Recognizing the importance of subjectivity in the treatment process, it is
Staley’s choice about whether he wants to receive medication prior to his
execution that prevents his treatment from becoming punishment and in
this context ensures that medication is in his interest.124 Depriving Staley
of this choice about his bodily integrity just prior to his execution
reinforces the view that his treatment has become a punishment that
appears to be an even more cruel and unusual violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
2. Forcibly Medicating Staley Violates the Fourteenth Amendment Because
It Greatly Infringes on Staley’s Bodily Integrity and Does Not Advance a

120. See Bonnie, supra note 5, at 277 (arguing that choice prior to execution is
pivotal to the inmate not becoming a means to the State’s retributive ends); see also
Associated Press, Oregon Judge Allows Condemned Man to Reject Reprieve from
Governor, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 3, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/04/us/oregonjudge-allows-condemned-man-to-reject-reprieve-from-governor.html?src=recg (noting
a judge’s ruling that an Oregon inmate even has the right to reject the Governor’s
clemency).
121. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (emphasizing that imprisonment does not
authorize the state to subject an inmate to involuntary treatment without affording him
additional due process rights).
122. See generally Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003) (stating that
determining what is medically appropriate should consider the impact of the
medication on the individual in light of its effects and the individual’s medical interest).
123. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 14.
124. See generally Rogers, 738 F.2d at 6, 9 (recognizing the right of an individual
with mental illness to be involved in his or her treatment analysis, even when he or she
is found to be incompetent).
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Legitimate State Interest Because Life Without Parole Is an Alternative
Punishment.
Forcibly medicating Staley to render him competent for execution
violates his bodily integrity absent actually furthering a legitimate state
interest. Neither the Singleton nor the Perry court denied the invasive and
potentially dangerous nature of anti-psychotic medication.125 In fact, the
Perry court underscored the invasive nature of medication and its forcible
administration prior to execution.126 Yet, the Perry and Singleton courts
again placed different weight on the inmate’s interest in avoiding forced
medication and on the state’s interest in using medication to further its goal
of implementing a lawfully imposed sentence.127
Staley, however, has been asymptomatic and has experienced
manifestations of his illness when medicated.128 Similar to the situation in
the Singleton case, forcible medication appears to be the only likely way to
render Staley competent for his execution.129 Nevertheless, akin to the
Perry case, commuting Staley’s sentence can be seen to offer an alternative
to fulfilling the state’s goals without inciting this controversy and has been
done in recent cases.130
However, both Singleton and Perry were decided before the final ruling
125. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1024 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Harper’s
recognition of the dangers of medication’s side effects, which Singleton did not
experience); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 760 (La. 1992) (finding that the
medication’s effects caused greater infringement on bodily integrity than other
intrusions).
126. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 760. But see Douglas Mossoman, Unbuckling the
“Chemical Straightjacket”: The Legal Significance of Recent Advances in the
Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1068-70 (2002)
(arguing that newer anti-psychotic medication offers fewer side effects and a lowered
chance of neurological damage than older drugs).
127. Compare Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1025 (finding punishing offenders whose
crimes justified the death penalty to be paramount and that forcible medication
provided the only viable means to further this interest), with Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761
(finding that forcibly medicating Perry did not further the state’s interest when his
sentence could be commuted).
128. Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at 3, at app. A, at 18.
129. See id. at app. A, at 9 (finding that without medication Staley believed he was
being executed due to a conspiracy involving the judge).
130. See Reginald Fields, Ohio Gov. John Kasich Commutes Inmate’s Death
Sentence
to
Life
in
Prison,
CLEVELAND.COM,
July
10,
2012,
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/07/ohio_governor_commutes_inmates.
html (noting that the Governor of Ohio commuted an inmate’s sentence to life
imprisonment after the inmate was found to be incompetent); see also Brief for
Appellant, supra note 12, at 11 (mentioning that many states provide for civil
commitment after incompetency and others follow an informal practice of dropping
attempts to execute an inmate).
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in Sell, where the Court determined that forcible medication must
significantly further the State’s interest, be unlikely to result in side effects
that influence a defendant’s ability to assist in his defense, and only be
administered where no less intrusive alternative exists to further the state’s
interest.131 Here, forcibly medicating Staley could result in effects that may
influence his understanding of his punishment and its imminence, and
therefore it may not further the state’s interest in retribution.132 Staley may
instead attain competency through a natural remission of his illness or
through non-drug therapies.133 Yet, commuting his sentence fulfills the
state’s interest in retribution without requiring this issue to remain in the
balance.134
Nevertheless, an argument can be made, as the dissent in Perry noted,
that the state also has an interest in ensuring that convicted murderers do
not feign mental illness.135 Indeed, an inmate has an interest in alleging
mental illness to avoid the death penalty.136 While advancements have
been made in diagnosing mental illness, absolute faith in a physician’s
capacity to determine when an inmate is malingering remains misplaced.137
Nonetheless, malingering mental illness requires high intelligence and
131. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (finding that weighing
potential side effects with the possibility of alternative treatment including non-drug
therapies is required). But see Christopher Slobogin, Sell’s Conundrums: The Right of
Incompetent Defendants to Refuse Anti-Psychotic Medication, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1523,
1532 (noting an exception may exist in Sell when an inmate’s guardian can make
decisions about his medication when the inmate is found to be incompetent).
132. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 14-15.
133. See generally Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (noting that alternatives to medication
including non-drug therapies may establish competency).
134. But cf. Ryan v. Gonzales, Nos. 10-930, 11-218, 2013 WL 68690 (January 8,
2013) (finding that a death row inmate suffering from mental illness may not
indefinitely stay his habeas proceedings until he is found competent).
135. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 780 (La. 1992) (Cole, J., dissenting)
(finding that the majority ignored the state’s interest in protecting society from capital
offenders seeking to avoid punishment by feigning mental illness); see also Sell, 539
U.S. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that weighing alternative treatment options
could lead defendants to opportunistically refuse medication).
136. See generally Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that since Singleton stated that taking medication could be in his interest, his allegation
that having to take medication after his execution date was set was not in his interest
reduced to a claim that his punishment is not in his interest).
137. See Joseph A. Toomey, The Utility of the MMPI-2 Malingering Discriminant
Function Index in the Detection of Malingering: A Study of Criminal Defendants, 16
ASSESSMENT 115, 119 (2009), available at http://asm.sagepub.com/content/16/1/115
(noting that a predominant test used to determine when a criminal defendant is feigning
mental illness failed to adequately differentiate those malingering from those who were
not).
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knowledge of its diagnostic tests.138 New technology, including brain
imaging, provides an opportunity to actually see the effects of
schizophrenia on the brain and thus offers grounds for more effective
diagnosis.139 That the Court has, at times, given deference to the medical
community regarding treatment determinations, coupled with the difficulty
of feigning mental illness, potentially over decades as the appeal process
endures, supports the notion that the State’s interest in this context is not
overwhelming.140 Additionally, the physicians in the Staley case all agreed
that Staley was not malingering.141 It is unlikely that Staley could feign his
illness for over twenty-one years while he was on death row and thus, it is
unlikely that the state has an interest in protecting society from his
avoidance of retribution for his crimes.
Ultimately, regarding the State’s interest, Sell found that within the
balancing test between the interest of an individual with mental illness and
the State, forcible medication must be necessary to further the State’s
goal.142 That the State, in Staley’s case, stressed its interest in enforcing his
punishment, which cannot be tied to Staley’s treatment, reinforces the view
that this scheme is unconstitutional.143 Finally, Staley’s case requires one
additional safeguard not present in either Sell or Riggins: that the State’s
interest must be tempered by the safeguards of the Eighth Amendment,
which is violated when Staley’s treatment, absent his choice, delivers him
to his punishment. Given the reality of Staley’s illness and his treatment,
his forcible medication is unconstitutional because it violates his bodily

138. See William V. Pelfrey Jr, The Relationship Between Malingerer’s Intelligence
and MMPI-2 Knowledge and Their Ability to Avoid Detection, 48 INT’L. J. OFFENDER
THER. COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 649, 655 (2004) (showing that factors including a higher
IQ and prior MMPI-2 knowledge contribute to the likelihood of an individual
successfully avoiding detection).
139. See Neuroimagining and Mental Illness: A Window Into the Brain, NAT’L INST.
OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/neuroimaging-andmental-illness-a-window-into-the-brain/neuroimaging-and-mental-illness-a-windowinto-the-brain.shtml (last visited January 29, 2013) (finding that while brain scans are
helpful in aiding in diagnosis, they alone cannot diagnose an illness).
140. See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-23, 231-33 (1990)
(noting that Harper’s forced medication was medically appropriate because it was
prescribed by a physician who determined it was appropriate treatment); see also Brief
for Appellee, supra note 14, at app. A, at 5 (noting that Staley was diagnosed with
schizophrenia in 1993 and thus would have had to have feigned illness for decades
throughout the appeal process, which was unlikely).
141. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 14, at app. A, at 10-11 (describing in
physicians’ testimonies that they did not believe Staley was malingering because of
their past experience with Staley).
142. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-183 (2003).
143. Brief for Appellant, supra note 12, at 21-22.
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integrity without significantly furthering a legitimate state interest when
life in prison without parole remains an alternative.144
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There are two additional factors that support the argument that Staley’s
forcible medication is unconstitutional: (1) the forcible medication scheme
places physicians in too precarious of an ethical situation, and (2) it violates
conceptions of human dignity and decency to make decisions about an
inmate’s ability to refuse medication where the inmate can either refuse
medication and live a life plagued by delusion or accept medication and
likely be put to death.145
First, the court in Perry recognized that there is a societal interest in
preserving the image of medicine as a healing profession that would be
eroded if physicians consistently faced the dilemma of whether they could
separate an inmate’s treatment from the reality of his or her punishment.146
Creating this conflict potentially erodes public trust of physicians who,
instead of being seen as healers, become too entwined with an inmate’s
execution.147 Placing physicians in this kind of ethical dilemma raises the
question of what would occur if physicians refused to prescribe medication
to these inmates.148 Ultimately, physicians may withdraw their support.149
Such a situation leaves society wondering when modern standards of

144. See generally Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (noting the importance of weighing
alternative and less intrusive treatments capable of achieving substantially the same
results); see also State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 770 (La. 1992) (quoting a Maryland
statute that allows trial courts, on remand, to convert death sentences to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole).
145. See generally Rhonda K. Jenkins, Fit to Die: Drug-Induced Competency for the
Purpose of Execution, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 149, 170-73 (1995) (finding that the medical
ethical dilemma and the precarious message that forcible medication jurisprudence
sends inmates are underlying issues in this analysis).
146. See generally Perry, 610 So. 2d at 761-62 (finding that the state itself also had
an interest in preserving the integrity of the medical community, which would be
damaged if physicians were associated with rendering inmates competent for their
deaths).
147. See Lerman, supra note 9, at 1945-46 (noting that society trusts that physicians
heal, not harm, and thus when physicians “enter the death chamber” and become
entwined with an inmate’s execution, they damage the general relationship between
doctors and their patients).
148. See id. at 1946-47 (arguing that if physicians ceased to be involved in the
process of lethal injection, it is foreseeable that the grounds for administering this form
of the death penalty in the United States would crumble).
149. See id. at 1945 (addressing the argument that involvement in the forcible
medication issue is held to be unethical by the AMA and APA, and conflicts with the
Hippocratic Oath).
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decency evolved to allow a punishment that, because it places physicians in
this dilemma and requires them to act unethically, appears increasingly
more cruel and unusual.150
Additionally, the tension created by the controversy between Perry
and Singleton is that Singleton ties any admission on the inmate’s part that
medication is ever in his interest to a justification for his forcible
medication.151 This dilemma denies an individual with mental illness the
opportunity to weigh his or her treatment options and determine that at
times, medication is the best option to alleviate the symptoms of his or her
illness, while at others medication is not in his or her best interest.152
Furthermore, it appears to distinctly punish individuals who have the “good
luck” of not experiencing some of the debilitating effects of medication.153
Though Perry found that forcible medication prior to execution was
unconstitutional, by framing the issue solely in terms of the state’s interest
in Perry’s execution, the Perry court did not address the issue of what
would occur if medication were justified on other grounds, such as
dangerousness.154 Perry also roots this opinion in Louisiana law.155
Nevertheless, the tension between these two cases raises the question of
whether a punishment reliant on so many varying factors and results could
ever be anything except arbitrarily enforced.156
V. CONCLUSION
If the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals addresses the issue of whether
Staley’s forcible medication is constitutional, it should rule that such a
scheme violates both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. To execute
an inmate who likely can only comprehend the imminence and purpose of
his punishment prior to his execution due to the forced manipulation of his
150. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (holding that standards
of decency and human dignity are embedded within the Eighth Amendment).
151. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003).
152. See generally Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1984) (recognizing the
right of an individual with mental illness who is committed to be involved in the course
of their treatment).
153. See Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1027 (noting that because Singleton did not
experience adverse side effects to his medication, his forcible medication could be in
his best medical interest).
154. See id. at 1035-36 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (noting that Perry tied the
constitutionality of Perry’s execution to the state’s goal in enforcing his sentence and
thus presumed that the state did not have an interest in medicating on other grounds).
155. See id. at 1026-7 (dismissing the Perry analysis in part because it relied on
Louisiana’s Constitution).
156. See generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (noting that
arbitrary punishment is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).
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mind and body by intrusive medication violates the protections of the
Eighth Amendment.157 Moreover, on the eve of his execution, to forcibly
inject Staley with dangerous medication that has caused him adverse
effects, that has been ineffective in treating his illness, and most
importantly, that he does not want to take, violates Staley’s due process
rights.158 Ultimately, this issue rests upon a need to respect Staley’s
fundamental control over his mind and body in an effort not to see him
merely as a means for the implementation of the state’s ends.

157. Id. at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring).
158. See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222-23 (1990) (holding that
for an inmate’s forcible medication to be constitutional it must be medically
appropriate and thus in the inmate’s best interest).
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